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 Citizenship, Free Movement, and EU Enlargement
Ψ 
 
 
It is not the European Union that is joining the Czech Republic. In other words, we see it as a 
two way street.
1 
        - External Relations Commissioner Hans van den Broek, 1996  
 
This would also be the best limit for our guardians to put on the size of the city. And they 
should mark off enough land for a city that size and let the rest go… As long as it is willing to 
remain one city, it may continue to grow, but it cannot grow beyond that point.
2 
            - Plato  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The European Union’s most significant enlargement admitted ten states in 2004: Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
Freedom of movement among all but Malta and Cyprus had for many years been restricted. Laws 
and policies similar to the Soviet propiska (residence permits) system—which placed severe 
limits on the right to move even between different cities within the Soviet Union, let alone 
between different Republics—restricted mobility under Communism. For individual citizens in 
the postcommunist states that joined the Union in 2004, freedom of movement symbolized the 
“return to Europe” of EU accession. By contrast to the restricted movement that citizens of many 
of these states had experienced under Communism, EU citizenship promised a right to reside and 
work anywhere within the territory of the Union. The perceived injustice of the delay in granting 
free movement rights to Spanish and Portuguese citizens helps explain the support of Spanish 
and Portuguese political leaders for European citizenship. The transition period for free 
movement of workers upon the accession of Spain and Portugal was seven years, which was 
reduced to six years as fears of massive immigration from those countries proved unfounded. 
Once the language of European citizenship was being widely invoked, it became politically more 
difficult to distinguish free movement of persons from free movement of goods, services, and 
capital. Experience with the Spanish and Portuguese accessions in 1986—and German 
reunification—quashed the objection in the discussions leading to Maastricht that extending 
mobility rights to all categories of member state nationals would lead to chaos. Yet the 
enlargement negotiations with the central and eastern European states witnessed a renewal of 
similar objections. 
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1 Voice of America, 4 February 1996, http://www.hri.org/news/usa/voa/1996/96-02-04.voa.html. 
  
 
2 Plato (1992 [circa 380 BCE]: 423b) 
  1There was a significant disjuncture between the existence of EU citizenship and the 
reality of the accession negotiations, in particular the transition arrangements passed to render 
enlargement more politically palatable in the existing member states. The negotiations 
disappointed those who hoped that European integration heralded a gradual move away from a 
focus on economic integration towards an increasing emphasis on individual rights. Because of 
largely unfounded fears of mass migration from accession countries to existing member states, 
full freedom of movement will be introduced only gradually. The addition of new member states 
with traditions of citizenship that differ from those of the existing member states alters the 
political dynamics affecting the future development of EU citizenship. 
Consequences of Free Movement for Enlargement 
 
All three Copenhagen criteria—the criteria formulated by the member states at the Copenhagen 
summit in June 1993 by which the membership applications of candidate states are judged—
affect freedom of movement. The first criterion—that EU member states must have stable 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection 
of minorities—affects free movement most notably in the area of human rights and protection of 
minorities. The second criterion—the existence of a functioning market economy and the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU—means examining 
an accession state’s ability to deal with immigrant workers from other EU member states. The 
third criterion—the ability of a candidate state to take on the obligations of membership, most 
notably by transposing and applying the entire corpus of EU legislation known as the acquis 
communautaire—affects the entire legal framework, and thus the existing provisions for free 
movement. 
 
As a consequence of their gradual development, European free movement rights 
categorize individuals by personal attributes and economic activity. Thus, for example, students, 
retirees, and professionals are covered by different pieces of legislation, which obfuscates the 
similarities in their rights. Even within the category of free movement of employed persons, an 
individual can be covered by one of five different regulatory frameworks. Self-employed 
workers exercise freedom of establishment when they move to another country to work; they are 
covered under cross-border provision of services when they continue to reside in their home 
country while providing services abroad. Employees are frontier workers if they work for a 
company that is not located in the same country as their residence; they are migrant workers if 
they move to another country to work for a foreign company; and they are posted workers if their 
home-country company sends them to work abroad. This separation of rights into different 
categories has struck some as odd and in need of change, particularly since the introduction of 
EU citizenship. Thus the 1998 High Level Panel argued that the “piecemeal development of EU 
rights on free movement of people [is] no longer consistent with the all-embracing status of 
European citizen created by the Treaty of Maastricht.”
3 
 
A significant difference between free movement and other issues is that the former is a 
central component of EU citizenship while the latter are not. EU citizenship confers the right of 
entry and residence to all citizens of member states. As an individual right, if EU citizenship is to 
be taken seriously, it must be respected by all member state governments. In theory, then, all 
                                                           
 
3 Veil and Commission of the European Communities (1998).  
  2citizens of new member states should have gained residency rights throughout the EU and all 
citizens of existing member states should have gained the right to move into the territory of the 
new member states when these states acceded to the EU. But this was not the case. Official 
documents relating to European enlargement scrupulously avoided mention of EU citizenship. 
Instead, the accession and enlargement debates focused on the four freedoms: free movement of 
goods, capital, services, and persons. 
 
Negotiations concerning free movement of goods proceeded very smoothly compared 
with the politically sensitive discussions regarding free movement of persons. In much the same 
way, free movement of goods had been guaranteed in the Treaty of Rome, while free movement 
of persons (rather than simply of workers) was fully achieved only after years of debate, with its 
recent implementation as a right of EU citizenship. The free movement of capital was more 
politically contested than free movement of goods, particularly on the question of the acquisition 
of secondary residences. Recognizing the “high political sensitivity” of this issue, the 
Commission proposed granting certain candidate countries a seven-year transitional period for 
the purchase by citizens of other EU member states of agricultural and forestry land, and a five-
year transitional period for the purchase of secondary residences.
4 Certain individuals, such as 
self-employed farmers who wished to establish themselves and reside in the future new member 
states, were not covered by the proposal. But rather than declaring that the right of establishment 
and the freedom to provide services are fundamental freedoms for EU citizens, the Commission 
simply asserted that the exemptions would protect “integrity of the single market.”
5 Under the 
right of establishment, any self-employed individual, along with his or her family, can move 
anywhere in the Union to establish a business. Thus, for example, a Polish citizen can move to 
Berlin or London as an independent contractor. Unlike free movement of workers, the right of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services have always been effective immediately upon 
accession. 
 
Of the four freedoms, the free movement of persons was the most hotly contested. This is 
evident from the timeline for the negotiations on the various chapters of the acquis: free 
movement of persons was left until the end. The negotiators relied on economic reasoning, and 
offered transitional arrangements to assuage those worried about workers from the candidate 
accession countries migrating to the existing EU member states. In April 2001, the Commission 
proposed phasing in full rights for the free movement of workers for all new member states other 
than Cyprus and Malta, acknowledging that the “aim of this proposal is to meet concerns where 
they arise and where they are justified, while allowing for mobility of workers,” and that 
instituting a transition period rather than immediately recognizing free movement rights would 
“ensure the widest possible public acceptance of enlargement.”
6 During a general transition 
period of five years, member states would continue to operate their own national measures on 
accepting workers from the new member states. After no more than two years, the Commission 
                                                           
 
4The proposed transitional period on agricultural and forestry land applies to Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
  Poland, Slovakia, and Bulgaria; for secondary residences to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. 
  Cyprus was granted a transitional period of 5 years for the acquisition of secondary residences, while 
  Estonia, Slovenia, and Lithuania did not request transitional periods. 
  
 
5 Commission of the European Communities (2001a).  
  
 
6 Commission of the European Communities (2001c).  
  3would conduct a review on the basis of which the Council, following consultation with the 
Parliament, could unanimously decide to shorten or lift the transition period. Another review 
could be requested by any member state, existing or new, with a view to further relaxation of 
controls. If any member state experienced serious disturbances in its labor market, it could 
maintain its national provisions for a further two years, meaning that full free movement rights 
for workers could take as long as seven years to take effect. 
 
The perceived necessity of these transition periods was curious. Before the 2004 
enlargement, approximately 300,000 nationals of candidate countries were legally employed in 
the EU. They accounted for just 0.2% of the total EU workforce, and roughly 6% of the 5.3 
million EU workers who were not EU citizens. In Austria, which had the highest share of 
workers from candidate countries, they accounted for 1.2% of the workforce; in Germany, 0.4%. 
Seven out of every ten accession state workers lived in Germany and Austria, but even in these 
two countries they represented only about 10% of all workers from outside the Union. There 
were also an estimated 600,000 undocumented workers and migrants from the candidate 
countries living in the EU.
7 Most studies predicted that few people would move from the new 
member states to the existing ones after enlargement, and the bilateral migration arrangements 
between candidate and existing member states were often not fully utilized: there were already 
more spaces for workers from candidate states to move to existing member states than there were 
workers willing to move.
8 Yet, despite the existence of EU citizenship, domestic political 
concerns trumped European rights. In the months preceding accession in May 2004, every 
member state except Ireland and the UK had decided to restrict access to its labor market, while 
Ireland and the UK restricted access to social benefits for citizens from the new member states. 
Proponents of transitional arrangements—primarily the governments of Germany and Austria—
pointed to precedent for support. The accessions of Greece in 1981 and of Spain and Portugal in 
1986 had indeed featured transitional arrangements, but the 1995 accessions of Austria, Sweden, 
and Finland had not. Citizens of those states became EU citizens upon accession and 
immediately enjoyed the full range of rights of EU citizenship. In fact, they had previously 
enjoyed free movement rights under EEA agreements. 
 
The focus on transitional arrangements was oddly incomplete: the transition covered only 
workers seeking employment with a company from an existing member state. Workers posted 
abroad by their companies, independent contractors seeking to relocate to the existing member 
states, and independent contractors wishing to provide services in the existing member states 
were not covered. Indeed, anyone not seeking employment from an existing member state 
company gained rights of residence immediately upon accession. This fit with precedent. Even in 
the accession of Spain and Portugal, the provision of services and the right of establishment of 
self-employed persons was not subject to transition periods.  
 
Nevertheless, the European Parliament urged the introduction of transition periods in 
“regions where workers are likely to commute across borders,” in order to “secure an urgently 
needed socially sustainable integration process.”
9 By contrast, Internal Market Commissioner 
                                                           
 
7 Commission of the European Communities (2001d: 29).  
  
 
8 Commission of the European Communities (2001e) De la Porte (2001: 11). 
  
  4Frits Bolkestein argued that “in a healthy economy it is better to prepare for competition than to 
erect new barriers. After all, the freedom of people to move is a central pillar of the single 
market.”
10 Rather than justifying freedom of movement in terms of European citizenship, 
Bolkestein, like most opponents of transitional arrangements, reverted to an economic logic. 
  
  Domestic politics explains the opposition to granting full free movement rights 
immediately upon accession. In Austria, anti-immigration rhetoric had recently increased and 
was invoked by Euroskeptics and others to argue against EU enlargement. Fears of waves of 
economically disadvantaged easterners flooding over the borders once they were lowered—
aqueous metaphors are common in immigration fears—were present in other member states as 
well. For example, the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party), a populist party with an anti-
immigration platform, regularly campaigns against free movement. It won twelve percent of the 
vote in 2001, becoming the third largest party in Denmark. Several years earlier, a poster for the 
“No” campaign against the Amsterdam Treaty warned about the coming enlargement: “Welcome 
to 40 million Poles in the EU.”
11 In Germany, some businesses and unions and opposed 
admitting workers from candidate accession states because they feared competition from lower 
wage laborers. Yet it would seem more logical for German firms to demand transition periods for 
Polish firms (right of establishment) which might compete with them rather than workers 
(freedom of movement) that they could hire for lower wages than their current workforce. 
 
The key exception to freedom of movement for individuals applied to people needing 
public assistance. The fact that social welfare arrangements differ in the candidate accession 
states as well as in the existing member states led some to revive the worry that freedom of 
movement between the existing member states and the accession states would lead to “social 
dumping,” whereby companies move to the countries with the lowest wages and least regulated 
labor standards. But an erosion of standards of welfare provision in the more established EU 
member states appears unlikely. Indeed the Europe Agreements signed with the candidate 
accession states appeared to lead to a race to the top rather than a race to the bottom in terms of 
the benefits provided under national social services regimes.
12 
Minority Rights 
 
Migrations are problematic for prevailing theories of citizenship, which generally assume a fixed 
political community whose members reside within one state’s territory and possess ties of 
citizenship to one and only one sovereign. This “territorial assumption” leads many to regard 
migrations as one-time events in which immigrants move to a new country to remain there for 
the rest of their lives.
13 The assumption that citizenship refers to a bounded, stable, and exclusive 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
9 European Parliament (2001b) at point 35. 
  
 
10Bolkestein (2000).  
 
 
11Stephen Bates, “Sceptical Danes eye EU exit door. Immigration fears are dominating Denmark’s 
 poll  on  Amsterdam,”  The Guardian, 23 May 1998, p.20. 
  
 
12 De la Porte (2001: 10).  
  
 
13 Elkins (1995).  
  5form of political community continues to inform political philosophy, and thus issues of justice 
and community membership. In this context, the extent of assimilation or acculturation which 
can be requested or required of new citizens is a key concern.
14 But the assumption of bounded 
political communities is empirically unsound, particularly in central and eastern Europe. 
 
The existence of many overlapping ethnic groups defines central and eastern Europe. 
Anyone studying the region’s history is struck immediately by the wealth of literature on 
minorities. There are countless detailed ethnographic studies of the history of various minorities, 
including studies of the situation of minorities under Communism.
15 A glance at a historical atlas 
containing maps of ethnicity shows a patchwork quilt in central and eastern Europe. This pattern 
has been simplified somewhat, particularly following the Second World War, but important 
minority populations still exist both within and beyond the new member states. 
 
One reason for the insistence that candidates states protect minority rights before 
accession was to diminish the chance of an exodus of minority populations. A pertinent example 
of what worried existing member states is attempts by Roma residing across the region to 
emigrate west. Following Czech commercial television station TV Nova’s 1997 broadcast of a 
misleading documentary about how Roma could easily emigrate to Canada, there was a dramatic 
increase in the number of Roma launching immigration and refugee claims, and the Canadian 
government reintroduced a visa requirement for Czech citizens. Shortly thereafter, when a 
similar TV Nova documentary promoting the UK as an immigrant’s paradise for Roma led to a 
spike in immigration claims, the UK imposed a visa requirement on Slovak citizens.
16 Various 
EU member states subsequently reimposed or refused to lift visa requirements on citizens of the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. This affected not only immigration 
visas but also travel visas. The reimposition of visa requirements for citizens wishing to travel in 
the EU increased tension between the majority populations, who generally perceived Roma 
emigration as economically motivated, and the Roma, who pointed to discrimination as a key 
factor for their desire to emigrate.
17 As the risk of high levels of Roma immigration seemed less 
likely, EU member states gradually lifted the visa requirements, but the emphasis on promoting 
minority rights in candidate states as a means to discourage emigration persisted throughout the 
accession negotiations.
18 
 
Most of the studies of freedom of movement focus on the potential for migration from the 
accession states to the existing EU member states, but freedom of movement is not necessarily a 
one-way flow from the new member states to the existing ones. Some member states were 
apprehensive about immigration from the existing member states. For example, Malta was 
                                                           
 
14 Habermas (1994).  
  
 
15See, for example, King (1973).  
  
 
16Čulík (1999) 
  
 
17 Vašecka (2001: 21).  
  
 
18 Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose 
  nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are 
  exempt from that requirement. 
  6concerned that large numbers of nationals of existing EU member states will move into its 
territory following enlargement. Given Malta’s small population, the existing member states 
were not worried about immigration from Malta. But Malta pushed for and obtained a “safeguard 
mechanism to be adopted on the freedom of movement of workers taking into consideration the 
disruption of the labor market in Malta in the event of a high inflow of workers following 
accession.”
19 Similarly, it is conceivable that, for example, municipalities in the Czech Republic 
might worry about German citizens moving to border areas and gaining control of the municipal 
councils.
20 A final type of free movement is possible: movement between the new member 
states. Consider, for example, the potential impact of granting Slovak citizens the right to live 
and work in Hungary—and vice versa.  
Consequences of Enlargement for Free Movement 
 
How will enlargement affect the future development of freedom of movement and, more 
generally, of EU citizenship? On the one hand, enlargement might not change the nature of 
integration. New states periodically joining the Union complicate the ways in which decisions 
about how best to further integrate are made, but this does not change the speed or scope of 
integration. On the other, enlargement might require slowing down integration. This tension is 
captured in the famous exchange between former External Affairs Commissioner Hans van den 
Broek and former Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus: Van den Broek responded to Klaus’ 
adamant denial that enlargement would be difficult with the observation that “it is not the 
European Union that is joining the Czech Republic.”
21 His reply reflects the concern that a 
choice is necessary between deepening and widening. Either the EU proceeds with further 
integration (deepening) or it expands the number of member states (widening). The two cannot, 
in the logic of this formulation, coexist. The enlargement process will necessarily lead to a 
cessation, for some period of time, of further integration. In the area of freedom of movement 
and perhaps in the field of EU citizenship more generally, enlargement will likely complicate, 
but certainly not stop, the various integration processes underway. 
 
The meaning and development of citizenship in central and eastern Europe raises special 
problems. With the exception of Malta, all of the new member states developed out of the decay 
and fall of three empires: the Russian empire, the Austro-Hungarian empire, and the Ottoman 
empire. Demographic movements and developments within these imperial realms were complex, 
and the relationship of the individual to political authority equally so. Recalling the distinction 
between state formation and empire building, some question the extent to which “western” 
notions of citizenship apply within the new member states.
22 
 
Again with the exception of Malta, this time expanded to include Cyprus and Turkey, all 
of the accession countries were until 1989 part of the Soviet bloc. Communist rule has certainly 
affected central and eastern European law, but the effects on citizenship policy are unclear. It is 
                                                           
 
19 European Parliament (2001a) at point 19. 
  
 
20I thank Jean Laponce for a discussion on this matter. 
  
 
21See footnote 1. 
  
 
22For one work distinguishing state formation and empire building, see Motyl (1999).  
  7true that there is no single model of central and east European citizenship, just as there is no 
single model of west European citizenship. In terms of policy convergence, however, existing 
member states may have to start grappling with the legacies of Communist-inspired or pre-
existing collectivist notions of the relationship of the individual to political authority. Some 
authors argue that the “Central-Eastern European countries have preserved (frozen, as it were, 
through the socialist period) a pre-World War Two version of the state and citizenship, in which 
the former is clearly the leading actor.”
23 Taking this seriously, the new accession states may 
have even more difficulty applying the acquis communautaire regarding individual rights than 
the existing member states. 
 
Another key issue is border security. There is a perceived tension between the demands 
of upholding the safety and confidence of the existing EU citizens and the desire to maintain 
current levels of cross-border interactions in the regions that will come to constitute the new 
frontiers of the EU. As the Commission notes, on “the one hand, enlargement should not cause 
any new division of Europe, especially in regions where close links exist. On the other hand, the 
future external border of the Union must meet the security needs of today’s EU citizens.”
24 In 
other words, the eastern borders of the new member states will take on new significance upon 
accession. 
 
States that currently participate in the Schengen system—removing internal border 
controls while coordinating external border controls—are likely to resist the adhesion of the new 
member states until these can demonstrate that they are able to fully apply Schengen standards.
25 
In order to speed the process and ease the fears of existing Schengen members concerning the 
candidate accession states’ ability to control their borders, the Commission has spent 
considerable resources to support the central European candidate countries in adopting and 
implementing the body of EU law in the field of migration, visa and external border control 
management.
26 The Schengen system will eventually apply to all new member states, but full 
participation in it will be based on a two-step process. “The new Member States will first need to 
achieve a high level of external border control upon accession whereas the lifting of internal 
border controls with current Member States will take place only at a later stage, subject to a 
separate decision by the Council.”
27 
 
Borders which were established and have been enforced since the decline of the three 
empires—those between the new member states—will once again fade in importance. After a 
century of very restrictive border controls, those areas of central and eastern Europe which have 
joined the Union will once again become a space in which migrations can occur with little 
hindrance from political authority. The demographic and political consequences of this 
development remain to be seen. 
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  8Enlargement and Citizenship 
 
Historical parallels can illuminate the proper relationship between enlargement and citizenship. 
Take, for example, US President Thomas Jefferson’s 1803 purchase of territory from the French 
government of Napoleon Bonaparte, doubling the size of the US. Although the Louisiana 
Purchase treaty stipulated that the inhabitants of the territories would “be incorporated in the 
Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the 
Federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of 
the United States,” there was a lengthy debate in Congress about whether the treaty could grant 
US citizenship.
28 As one Senator noted, bestowing citizenship by treaty was unconstitutional: 
“We can hold territory; but to admit the inhabitants into the Union, to make citizens of them, and 
States, by treaty, we cannot constitutionally do.”
29 In response, newly elected Senator John 
Quincy Adams proposed a constitutional amendment giving Congress the authority to 
incorporate new territories into the Union and bestow citizenship on the inhabitants of those 
territories.
30 His proposal was rejected, and there followed lengthy debates before the issue was 
finally settled. The question of whether the EU can simply bestow citizenship with the 
enlargement treaties was not raised, although the underlying dynamic is the same as it was with 
the Louisiana Purchase: the extension of the polity to new territory, and the granting of rights to 
the inhabitants of those territories. 
 
The accession of new member states is not a one-time event but rather a gradual process, 
as the protracted negotiations on implementing the acquis communautaire indicate. Though it is 
difficult to conceive of citizenship in terms of a gradual process, the extension of EU citizenship 
rights to citizens of new member states is proceeding in stages, as this paper’s discussion of the 
free movement of workers demonstrates. Yet citizenship is usually seen as a unitary status: either 
one is a citizen or one is not. That is not the way to think of citizenship in this case, because the 
current enlargement involves step-by-step extension of rights to individuals. 
 
Most analyses of EU enlargement focus on economics. This paper’s focus on citizenship 
opens up a wide range of social and political factors. Analyzing citizenship means going well 
beyond describing the “technical, depoliticized process of exporting the Union’s acquis 
communautaire.”
31 Enlargement forces a new examination of the content and meaning of EU 
citizenship. The question of whether there are some core rights and some auxillary ones is raised 
when the key right of EU citizenship—the right to move and take up residence—is denied to at 
least one important category of individuals: migrant workers from accession countries. EU 
citizenship is not a fixed category. Its meaning is contested by the various EU institutions, 
national governments, groups, and individuals, and this contestation is a key to understanding 
European integration. By highlighting the contestation, the enlargement process illuminates the 
nature of European integration. The challenge of enlargement of the Union from fifteen member 
states to twenty-five or more, coupled with the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
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  9nationality, ensures that the “dynamic institution” of EU citizenship has not yet reached a stable 
equilibrium. 
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